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Abstract
Electric power is so vital to both our economic and personal wellbeing that the erstwhile state
policy in most of the developing countries, including India, had vested the power industry in the
hands of the state as a promotional agency for subsidized supply. However, with the onset of the
neo-liberalism in the wake of the fall (of the threat) of socialist alternative, the promotional
orientation in the state policy had to give way to efficiency considerations in the sense of a
neoclassical market economy. Thus has started the infamous power sector restructuring, the
technical term for ultimate privatization. Radical policy changes were legislated in India and so far
13 States have reorganized their power sector; in Orissa, Delhi and Noida in Uttar Pradesh power
distribution was entirely privatized. Kerala with a militant trade union presence has so far been
dragging her feet, even in the face of the stern legislative requirement, portending an ultimate
surrender. In this context the present paper attempts to draw some lessons from actual experiences
elsewhere.
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1. Power sector reform: ‘There is no alternative!’
Since electricity cannot be readily stored, but must be supplied continuously in adjustment with
varying demand, it is technically required that power sector is to be a vertically integrated natural
monopoly of generation, transmission, and distribution. Scale economies and specific assets (those
with high costs for consumers to switch suppliers), particularly in distribution, provide the natural
monopoly with considerable market power. As electric power is vital to both our economic and
personal well-being and thus to development in general, a power system is expected to supply
electrical energy as economically as possible, and with a high degree of quality and reliability. If
its supply is left to the vagaries of the market forces generated from personal profit motives, a
sizeable proportion of the population without the backing of adequate purchasing power would
remain excluded from development. Hence the significance of control or regulation of this sector.
In most of the countries, therefore, the government had wielded the monopoly power of the
electricity industry for the general wellbeing. The Venkataraman Committee of 1964 in India has
thus rightly stated that the Electricity Boards as statutory bodies intended to play a promotional
role in power development will have to subserve the socio-economic policies of the State and
therefore cannot view every one of developmental activities exclusively from the point of view of
profits or return, and that the programs like rural electrification may not be profitable looking
purely from a commercial angle, but electrical undertakings will have to implement this program
in the national interest (Government of India 1964 a).
However, the post-war period public enterprise experiments had an unfortunate but avoidable
history of dysfunctionings in general in a background of high level corruption and pork-barrel
politics. Subsequently, the Thatcherite experiments, on a ‘There is no alternative (TINA)’ logic,
brought the public sector down from the ‘commanding heights’ to a tragic, premature end. The
reform in the electricity supply industry (ESI) of England and Wales was ranked as one of the most
ambitious and the most appealing attempts anywhere to introduce competition into a normally
vertically integrated monopoly, This in turn had far reaching consequences of spread effect across
the globe, ushering in an era of re-emerged liberalism. Further fillips came from the Reagonomics,
4and the historic fall of the Communist Bloc in the 1980s. Still further fuels were poured by the
premier international financial agencies in the course of their apotropaic mission of delivering the
developing nations from the apparent fiscal crisis that their ‘infatuation’ with the public sector
slogans eventually enticed them into. And thus started the siege!
While power sector reforms in most of the developed nations have largely been an emulation
endeavour of the famous ‘big experiments’ of the UK with the radical liberalism, the causative
spur for reforms or restructuring in almost all the developing nations has been whipped up by their
survival surge out of the infamous fiscal crisis. Chile pioneered the movement, much before the
UK, initiating the reform process as back as in 1978 with the help of the World Bank. The ‘global
fiscal crisis’ gave the World Bank the much sought after leverage in devising a conditional loan
policy. In fact the euphemism of structural adjustment entered into the international parlance in
1980 with the introduction of the World Bank’s structural adjustment loan (SAL) as a new type of
credit. This was to provide quick-dispersing loans to finance general imports over a period of years
conditional on an agreed set of measures intended to strengthening the balance of payments (BoP)
while maintaining a development momentum. During the 1980s, however, the Bank’s original
emphasis on the BoP gradually faded away, while the stress upon the ‘economy-wide programs of
reforms’ got much more strengthened. Later on the Bank switched emphasis from SAL to sectoral
adjustment loans with narrower policy objectives, though the general policy thrust is similar. For
added momentum, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) also rose to the occasion in 1986 with a
new Structural Adjustment Facility, intended to provide medium-term BoP assistance to low
income countries facing protracted balance of payments (BoP) crisis in return for a program of
policy measures dictated by the IMF. It was augmented at the end of 1987 by an Enhanced
Structural Adjustment Facility with considerably greater resources.
Most of the countries in Africa, Latin America (Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, etc.) and Asia
(New Zealand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, etc.) set out on such reform path towards a
deregulated privatised electricity industry. In all these countries electricity supply is now no longer
the statutory monopoly of the State-owned public utilities; independent power producers (IPP)
have already made their powerful appearance. Power ministries or authorities have been converted
into corporations (even in the ‘socialist’ China and Vietnam). Most of the former Communist Bloc
countries also started large scale restructuring: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Croatia,
who were also keen to join the European Union (EU). Among the OECD countries, the UK,
Canada, Germany, Spain, and Australia made ‘great strides’ towards privatisation, while
liberalisation gathered momentum across the US, Ireland, Sweden, Norway, and New Zealand.
The only electricity industry in the public sector that still stands impervious to the sweeping waves
of the so called reform reagents is the Electrcite de France (EDF) in the hands of the French
Government. Within the EDF, the electric sector is totally integrated – generation, transmission
and distribution. The vertical integration includes also the supply of primary energy supplies viz.,
water and coal. Countrywide, the state’s monopoly consists of 85 per cent of the generation, 100
5per cent of the transmission, and 95 per cent of the distribution. Private electricity production is
subject to heavy constraints – it is forbidden to sell or to supply electricity to a third party. The
producers, having surplus power generation, net of their own consumption, are connected to EDF’s
network, and EDF is bound to buy the private production.
2. Lessons from the Global Experiences
One of the most pronounced effects of liberalisation of the power sector has been an improved
power supply position in those countries where power shortage as a major problem was one of the
primary causatives for the opening up of the power sector to IPPs (as in the Philippines, for
example). However, in some other countries (e.g., Indonesia and Thailand) this has resulted in over
capacity and the consequent excess obligation to make capacity payments (World Bank 2000). The
evidences on efficiency, the singularly acclaimed hallmark of competition, however, are not
conclusive. The results are mixed as regards the investment efficiency (long-run) and operating
efficiency (short-/medium-run).
‘Where privatisation has occurred with the liberalisation of an energy sector, the cost of capital
used in decision-making is likely to increase. The cost of capital for such new projects increases
because of the reduced availability not only of cash-flow to repay investments guaranteed by
taxpayers and captive customers, but also of favourable interest rates which a government [on the
other hand] can obtain for financing projects’, according to a 1998 Report on Liberalization and
Privatization of the Energy sector by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC 1998: 76).
Such an increased investment cost regime necessarily leads to higher (than socially optimal !)
marginal cost and tariff of electricity. For instance, most of the fast track projects of the IPPs
especially with predominantly foreign funding, Dabhol Power Project being an initial typical case,
accepted wholeheartedly by India, have had capital costs significantly higher than the potential
indigenous alternatives (say, of National Thermal Power Corporation, NTPC). (For example, the
capital cost of Dabhol Power Project (Phase I) was Rs. 4.48 crores per MW, whereas that of the
NTPC projects might have been in the range of Rs. 3 crores to Rs. 3.6 crores per MW. The IPPs
with foreign direct investment (FDI) imposed as much as 40 per cent service cost on foreign
resources, while the upper bound for the cost of foreign resources could have been barely 15 per
cent). Most of the IPPs are financed through bilateral credit, which perforce involves tying of
equipment, and overpricing. Experiences of other developing countries on liberalisation path may
not be much different and an inductive generalisation of the Indian experience is quite warranted.
For example, in Indonesia, tariffs in the PPAs, established through negotiation between PLN and
project companies (including consortium partner companies owned by or with close links to high
government officials), have been in the range of 6 to 8 US cents per unit, far higher tha PLN’s
retail tariff rates of about 3 US cents per unit (World Bank 2000). Moreover, indexing the PPA
tariffs to the US dollar in most of these developing countries serves as a heavy drain of the limited
forex reserves, and the ‘fiscal crisis’ has dealt severe blows to these economies through this
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these countries. In the case of liberalising developed countries, for example, the UK, the ‘main
argument for expecting improved investment efficiency is that a privatised industry is likely to
introduce proven technology more quickly, while avoiding the temptation to invent the next-
generation technology (such as Advanced Gas-cooled Reactors, AGRs)’, that saves investment
costs. But nothing bars a public sector utility too to follow suit.
A significant component of operating efficiency concerns using the right inputs of fuel and labour
in the right amounts, i.e., reducing the costs of generation. In the UK, ‘The effect of privatisation
on the generators is that they have nearly halved their staff in the first three years, as well as
closing research laboratories. There are clearly strong incentives to reduce the cost of fuel' (but
'this has primarily affected British Coal’). In the investor-owned utilities in the US, the same
pattern of a decrease in the level of staff is registered, with a reduction of about 100 000 employees
during 1986-95 period. Their total operating and maintenance (O&M) costs have decreased by
nearly 25 per cent, mainly, however, due to the decline in the fuel costs, though there has been
some reduction in non-fuel O&M costs. (ICC 1998: 53-54). The internal restructuring of the
Electricity Corporation of New Zealand (ECNZ) resulted in reduction of staff numbers directly
employed from around 6000 in 1987 to fewer than 3200 by 1992 (Culy, Read and Wright 1996:
333). Though the reduction in the number of the employed has been accused of adversely affecting
customer service, there is not enough data to support a conclusion either way.
Many studies in the US have found that the electricity prices of the publicly owned utilities are
much lower than of the private utilities, the prices of the regulated privately owned electric utilities
being lower than of the unregulated ones (Smiley and Greene 1983; Moore 1970; Peltzman 1971).
Some studies (for instance, Pescatrice and Trapani 1980) have found the costs incurred by private
utilities as much higher than the costs of public utilities.
The energy crisis, particularly the Californian power crisis, has however, lent an inflationary trend
to the power price in general. The worst hit has been California, whose electricity prices had been
much higher than other states’ prices in the US, on account mainly of cost overruns of nuclear
power and the expensive alternative ‘green’ power. Deregulation was conceived of inducing
competition among numerous sellers and reducing prices. However, the wholesale electricity peak
hours spot prices in California, which was much less than $ 50 per megawatt-hour before 1998,
began to shoot up by 2000 and crossed $ 300-mark by 2000 end (The Economist, January 20,
20001: 57). On May 8th, 2001, it reached the all-time high of $ 560 per megawatt-hour (The
Economist, May 12, 2001: 39). With the retail prices being kept capped, these rate hikes have not
affected the customers, but the suppliers have been driven to the red. Under pressure from the
suppliers, however, there was initially a 10 per cent rise in the retail rates, and later on by more
than 40 per cent (mainly for business customers). Finally as there appeared signs that California's
power crisis might be spreading to neighbouring states, the top electricity regulator of the country,
7the FERC, tightened its grip; in June 2001, it unanimously voted to impose a form of price control
on wholesale electricity prices in 11 western states, including California.
The labour markets of the developing countries on the liberalisation front have however been the
worst affected. Phenomenal increase in economy-wide unemployment has been the pinching price
of reform in these countries (for example, Argentina, Chile, etc.; some of the European countries
too have faced the same problem, for instance, Sweden), in terms of big cuts into the over-manning
inefficiency in the public sector, coupled with a complete employment freeze in this sector
following fiscal tightening measures by the Governments. Whereas in the developed countries
such as the UK, the US, Australia, etc., the reform-induced unemployment rise has subsided in due
course, it has remained unabated in the other countries on account mainly of structural potential
differences. The developed countries have already been endowed with a developed and hence
highly flexible and absorbent private sector; moreover, the erstwhile public sector, once
restructured and opened up, has also been able to respond in quick positivity to the changes by
accommodating more private initiatives with copious openings. Such structural resilience and
adaptive response, promoting ‘inward’ investment, cannot be expected in a developing economy
with an immature and imbecile private sector; and the drastic cuts into (over-)employment in the
restructured sectors in these countries just go to swell the tidal waves of unemployment. The
reform has been an ill-timed imposition, ignoring the logical necessity of development of some
prerequisites for it, at a high cost.
A perverse effect of the private initiative to increase cost efficiency in restructured ESI has been
the strong incentives and tendencies to retire the older, labour-intensive, coal-fired power plants,
especially in the UK. The real motive behind this has, however, been to raise prices by restricting
supply (Newbery and Green 1996: 74). Price-raising machinations are innate to practical private
enterprise logic, through, say, collusion. Competitive efficiency presupposes a transparent, liquid
market. On the other hand, ‘In an imperfectly competitive industry, the opportunities for raising
prices above operating cost is greater.’ (op. cit.: 71). In the English electricity supply industry
(ESI), for example, the combined market share of generation output of the privatised National
Power and PowerGen, among about 35 generation companies, has been about 50 per cent; such
large size (market concentration) has given these two generators ‘the ability to bid at prices well
above marginal cost, with potentially serious dead-weight losses as a result’ (op.cit: 73; also Green
1999), giving the lie to the ideal of competition by means of transparency and liquidity. This
experience has taught, for example, Argentina, to divide the generation sector of its ESI into a
number of generation companies of comparable size before privatisation. However, such
horizontal split may not often be technically feasible and economically viable, much of which
depends on the size distribution of plants also. On the other hand, market liquidity as well as
transparency might be secured under conditions of a contestable contract market, that might drive
the contract prices of the generators down to the long-run marginal cost (LRMC) of entrants
(Newbery and Green 1996: 73), if such conditions are achievable.
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and experiences across the globe corroborate this. Moreover, MC pricing favours the large
industrial customers and penalises the small retail consumers (in sharp contrast to the actual
practice in many developing countries). Thus electricity prices have declined in real terms much
more for the industrial customers, for instance, in the UK, the US, and in the Nordic market. Real
price reductions for domestic customers in these developed countries have however been less,
partly because of the lack of economies of bulk purchase unlike in the case of larger consumers,
and because of the expensive meter charge requirements (ICC 1998). In most of the developing
countries, electricity prices were heavily subsidised. For example, the World Bank Report on Long
Term Issues in India’s Power Sector (1991) estimated that the average customer tariffs in India
were less than half of LRMC. Liberalisation lets loose this spiral up across the LRMC cap, as the
Philippines experience confirms. The entry of IPPs there has resulted in very high cost of power.
We have already seen that the entry of IPPs with FDI (e.g., in India, and in other developing
countries too) into the power sector generally results in higher (than socially efficient) marginal
capacity costs and hence prices. Rapid liberalisation measures in developing countries often
involve some ineluctable tendencies of ex cathedra assertions and attempts to legitimise such
monopoly pricing practices in the hope of attracting IPP entry, and at the same time to impose cold
turkey measures of cost-oriented sharp tariff rises on the customers, unlike the phased program of
tariff revisions in the Philippines. Apt examples in point are the controversial behaviour of the
Telecom Regulatory Authority of India in tariff revision on the morrow of the privatisation of the
sector, and the recent electricity tariff hike in AP in line with MC pricing principles that has sent
the worst shock waves across a hitherto pampered sector of residential customers. In some of the
countries, this is often characterised and justified in terms of a trade off between cheaper power
and more investment for the benefits of quality of service. In China too the ‘consumers are heavily
affected by the reforms in the shape of higher prices, but are rewarded by improved quality of
service’ (Andrews-Speed et al. 1999: 446).
One of the festering problems associated with power sector reform stems from the evaluation and
solution of ‘stranded costs’. The situation refers to the prospect that, as the ESI becomes more
competitive, the assets of some utilities may become obsolete and they may not be able to earn
enough to recover the costs of these investments. In other words, with competition and entry of
new, low-cost generators, electricity prices tend to fall, and the older high-cost generators or
suppliers are left unable to recover the cost of their plants or contracts. The unrecovered costs thus
become stranded. Wide variation exists in the estimates of stranded costs, because of uncertainty
of information. For example, the stranded-cost losses of the US ESI are estimated to range from $
10 billion to $ 200 billion (Brennan et al. 1996: 100). The real issue is regarding its resolution:
should the investors be forced to swallow these losses, or should these be transferred to the
customers in higher retail prices? Stranded costs are said to have played a role in the Californian
power crisis: under pressure from the big and politically powerful utilities, the state agreed to value
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new entrants (as well as to customers). Thus the new entrants have become severely handicapped
to compete on price (The Economist, January 20, 2001: 58).
Another important source of concern is the impact of market reforms on environment. The blind
profit-fetish of the private enterprise has always been at the target end of accusals of reckless
corrosion of environment. Generation of electricity produces at least four forms of air pollution: (i)
particulate patter (soot, dust, dirt, aerosols), (ii) sulphur dioxide (SO2), primarily responsible for
acid rain, (iii) nitrogen dioxide (NO2, or in general nitrogen oxides, NOx), and (iv) greenhouse
gases, especially carbon dioxide (CO2), mainly responsible for contributing to the greenhouse
effect (global warming, a general increase in the temperature at the earth’s surface).1 However,
evidences indicate that environmental effects of reforms are case-specific, and hence can be
positive or negative, depending on the market circumstances. Much depends in turn on the types of
electricity generation plant and fuel mix. In fact, the development of combined cycle gas turbine2
(CCGT) technology, that has facilitated privatisation of generation sector, has demonstrated
natural gas as a viable replacement generation fuel, more thermal efficient than coal, and less
environment-detrimental (through decreased production of harmful emissions). For example, it
can almost eliminate emissions of sulphur dioxide, and reduce considerably the emissions of
oxides of nitrogen and carbon dioxide. Moreover, natural gas-fired plants produce no sludge or
ash, thus averting problems of landfill availability and groundwater contamination. However, the
problems associated with the discharge of warm water mixed with effluents back into the
sea/lake/river still persist. The rise in temperature at the discharge point will affect the flora and
fauna of the receiving waters. In the UK, natural gas has replaced coal as generation fuel to an
extent of 30 per cent of the UK’s electricity generation. However, where non-fossil fuels such as
hydro and nuclear predominate the generation fuel mix, competition could result in increased use
of fossil fuels for generation, if found economically more viable, with the consequent increase in
1 Particulate matter, besides affecting visibility and exposed surfaces, can create or intensify breathing and heart
problems and lead to cancer. The smaller particles cause the most damage. Sulphur dioxide is a gas that may affect
heart and lungs in ways similar to particulates. Moreover, it may damage trees and lead to acid rain, that harms lakes
and streams and corrodes exposed materials (e.g., outsides of buildings). It is suspected that sulphuric acid and nitric
acids may be produced from the sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides present in polluted air. Nitrogen dioxide is a
brownish gas with adverse effects similar to those of sulphur dioxide. Besides, it can in the sunlight contribute to the
formation of ground-level ozone (or smog), that causes respiratory problems and crop losses. Nitrogen dioxide (NO2)
is produced when nitric oxide (NO) emitted from power plants combines with oxygen in the air. In general,
discussions of nitrogen-based air pollution refer to nitric oxide (NO) and nitrogen dioxide (NO2) together as nitrogen
oxides (NOx). Nitrogen oxide emissions presently merit the most immediate policy attention.
2 A combined cycle power plant is one that utilises the combined cycle technique for increasing substantially the
conversion efficiency of using gas for electricity generation. The technique involves first using the gas to fuel a
combustion turbine (or gas turbine, which uses the expansions of burnt gases to turn the turbine for power generation),
and then recovering the waste (exhaust) heat to generate steam for application to a conventional steam turbine for
further power generation.
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greenhouse gas emissions. For example, a study by Hendry Lee and Negeen Darani of Harvard
University in 1995 found that restructuring could lead to substantial rise in nitrogen oxide
emissions: a 78 billion kWh increase in generation from existing coal facilities (two-thirds of
which are assumed to be replacing generation from less-polluting plants and one-third of which is
assumed to be supplying new demand) could lead to a 500,000 ton increase in nitrogen oxide
emissions (Lee and Darani 1995). Another study by Dallas Burtraw and Karen Palmer of
Resources for the Future in 1996 suggested that the amount of additional generation from existing
coal-fired plants stimulated by restructuring could be substantially larger than Lee and Darani’s
estimate, depending in part on the rate of growth of transmission capacity (Burtraw and Palmer
1996).
The greatest lessons of power sector reforms come from the Californian experience in the US and
the Enron experience in India. The first and one of the most ambitious deregulation plans in the
US, the Californian experiment has, however, proved fatal to the interest of the public and the
state, and has at last resulted in ‘re-regulation’ by the government, all within five years. The
Californian deregulation had in effect replaced a stable price system ensured through government
regulation with a ‘free’ market of violently fluctuating prices influenced by a group of profiteering
out-of-the-state generators. California with 50,000 MW capacity could have well met a 31,000
MW peak load, but 11,500 MW capacity went out of service due to unplanned outages3 (Reddy
2001). Moreover, California could not add to its installed capacity during the last decade thanks to
the toughest environmental laws and the ‘not in my back yard’ (NIMBY) syndrome among its
public. The setting was ideal for the unscrupulous profiteers and the ‘contrived’ supply scarcity
pushed the prices up without limit. The soaring wholesale prices4 (e.g., reaching $ 1.40 per unit)
against a capped retail price (at $ 0.066 per unit) plunged the supply utilities into the red (ibid.). As
their credit ratings plummeted, generators refused to sell them power. Losses drove the state’s two
main utilities close to collapse. PG&E, the largest utility serving the northern part of the state, filed
for bankruptcy protection on April 6, 2001. On April 9, government agreed to buy part of the
transmission grid owned by the other major utility, SCE, for $ 2.8 billion (in an effort to restore its
3 One of the significant factors that led to the crisis was the ban on long term contracts between the supply utilities and
generators (‘forward power’). Paul Joskow notes the consequences: ‘If a generator has a long term contract, then the
financial incentive is to generate steady power in order to maximise sales. If you have no contractual promises and
there is a new price every day on a spot market, then your incentive is to withhold production to maximise price.’
(quoted in Easterbrook 2001: 44). So it happened in California. Behind the artificial supply scarcity following
‘massive plant outages’, there was an encouraging factor too: the independent power generating companies owned by
the out-of-state profiteers were not bound by the same legal obligations that governed the regulated utilities.
4 The electricity spot market price, which was $ 30 per megawatt-hour in 1998, went up as high as $ 1500 on some
days thereafter. It is reported that the phenomenal price rise resulted in some ‘economic absurdities’ also. Some of the
big factories having long term low-priced power contracts found that they could make more money now by simply
closing down and marketing their unused power allotment! For instance, The Kaiser Aluminium plant in Mead in
Washington seized this opportunity and closed down the plant in November 2000, and began to sell the whole
electricity, contracted from the Bonneville Power Administration at $ 22.50 per megawatt-hour for the plant
consumption, back to the same organisation at $ 555 per megawatt-hour! (ibid.)
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financial health through injection of cash). It should be added that cities like Los Angeles with
publicly owned utilities that did not opt for deregulation has remained unaffected.
CALIFORNIA’S POWER CRISIS
On January 16th [2001], the Californian state assembly passed a bill giving the state a
central role in the local electricity market. This, in effect, turned the clock back on the
deregulation of California’s power industry begun in 1996 amid grand promises of
reduced rates for consumers, and bigger markets for power companies. But in fact, the
state had few options. On the same day, two of California’s largest utilities had their
debts reduced to junk by the leading credit agencies after one of them, Southern
California Edison (SCE), announced that it would not be paying $ 596 million due to
creditors, in order to “preserve cash”.
That undermined the ability of SCE and of Pacific Gas & Electric (PG & E), the other
big utility in the state, to buy power on credit, and pushed them to the brink of
bankruptcy. On the same day, a “stage 3” emergency was declared, the highest level of
alert, called only when power reserves fall below 1.5 % of demand. On January 17th,
one-hour black-outs rolled round the area of northern California served by PG & E. And
Governor Gray Davis declared a state of emergency, authorising the state water
department to buy power.
This is a dreadful mess for a state that is held up around the world as a model of
innovation and dynamic markets, and that was the first in America to pursue
deregulation.
- The Economist (January 20, 2001: 57)
However, the power crisis led to an active role of the FERC in 're-regulation'. In June 2001, it
unanimously decided to impose price cap control on wholesale electricity prices in the whole
western electricity grid (including California). It should be noted that the FERC had already put
partial price caps on California, applicable only during emergencies. The new regulations extended
these caps to all periods and throughout the western grid. And it just shows that all is not well with
the deregulation bids.
3. Reform in the Indian Power sector
Installed capacity in the Indian power sector, which was only 1564 MW in 1950-51, increased
to 141,079.84 MW as on 31.01 2008, marking an annual compound growth rate of about 8.2 per
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cent; and electricity generation increased from 5100 million units (MU) in 1950-51 to 586030
MU in 1997-98, at nearly 8.7 per cent growth rate. The per capita consumption of electricity,
which was less than 15 units at Independence, rose to 631 units in 2005-06 at about 6.7 per cent
growth rate. Among other growth indicators, the percentage of villages electrified increased
from 1500 in 1947 to 474,928 (about 82 % of the total 579,000) in 2004. However, these
apparent achievements appear trifle in relation to real requirements. Serious power shortages
have been plaguing the country for a long time; in 1997-98, India faced a peaking shortage of
about 11.3 per cent and energy shortage of about 8.1 per cent, and the situation worsened in the
following years, the peaking shortage reaching 15.2 % in 2007-08 and energy shortage, 9 %.
This chronic shortage situation has been the inevitable outcome of a cumulative decline in
capacity addition in the power sector, explained by the compounded effects of an increasingly
inadequate investment tempo and the inordinate, but avoidable, delays in project completion.
Investment deficiency and inefficiency have thrived in both the segments of the sector – Central
and State (as also private).
The deficiency syndrome has had behind it a long history of abuses and aberrations of public
sector management dictums and dictates. The 1980 Report of the (Rajadhyaksha) Committee on
Power had the following to remark on the inefficiency of the Indian power sector:
“Under the Electricity Supply Act, which regulates the operation of the SEBs, the Boards were
not till recently specifically required to earn a return on the capital they use. A number of
committees, of which particular mention should be made of, examined the working of the SEBs
and recommended a gross return of 9.5 per cent (excluding electricity duty) on capital
employed after providing for operating expenses and depreciation. However, when the statute
was amended in 1978, although it was provided that Boards should earn a positive return, no
specific figure was mentioned.
“In actual practice, however, the Boards are often regarded as promotional agencies to be used
to subsidise different classes of consumers and with little or no control over their tariff policy.
As a result, on the whole, the returns specified by the Venkataraman Committee have not been
realised and on the contrary, large arrears of interest are due to the State Governments on the
loans given by them to the SEBs…
“Besides low tariffs, the causes of the poor financial performance are the low operating
efficiencies, high capital cost of projects due to long delays in construction and high overheads
– mainly the result of heavy overstaffing. Although precise comparisons are not possible, the
average employees per MW of installed capacity in India is 7, compared to 1.2 in the USA, 1.5
in Japan, and 1.7 in the UK. Within the country, the expenditure on salaries varies from 12 per
cent to 40 per cent of the total income of the SEBs. Much of this overstaffing is due to SEBs
being compelled under political pressures to take on people they do not need.
13
“The result of all this is that many of the Boards are wholly dependent upon the State
Government even for meeting their normal operating expenses making it even more difficult for
them to function as the autonomous bodies which they were set up to be.
“The weaknesses in the management of the utilities, in particular the SEBs, … arise partly out
of the desire of some State Governments to exert a high degree of day to day control on the
operations of the Boards, and partly due to management culture, inherited from the bureaucratic
style of functioning, that most SEBs had when they were Government Departments.”
(Government of India 1980: 4)
Thus on the one hand, the SEBs remained cash-strapped and on the other, the conventional
source of funding (i.e., the Government) unreasonably began to dry up. There was a steady
deceleration over time in the Plan provisions to the power sector, leading to cumulative
investment deficiency. And then to crown the worst, there descended before the sector an
impasse out of the infamous fiscal crisis at the dawn of the 90s.
Confronted with the consequences of the Gulf war in a political flux of frequent changes in
Government, India plunged into a deep balance of payments (BoP) crisis in the second half of
1990-91. As India’s credit rating in international capital markets nose-dived, access to external
capital borrowing narrowed and substantial capital flight occurred out of the country. In June
1991, despite a severe squeeze on imports, India wavered on the verge of a default on external
debt obligations for the first time in her history. However, she survived the crisis, and she
emerged unscathed, but with a new flag of ideological allegiance in her hand. She emerged
enlightened “that the economy needed substantial reforms if the crisis was to be fully
overcome”, and that “both the BoP problems which were building up over t he past few
years and the persistent inflationary pressure were the result of large budgetary fiscal
deficits which characterised the economy year after year….A reversal of the trend of fiscal
expansionism was essential to restore macroeconomic balance in the economy” (Government of
India 1992: 11). The fiscal correction that followed the awakening meant still meagre
provisions to an already starving power sector, designed on the premise that further investments
required in the sector should be financed from internal resources. A system traditionally attuned
to unaccountability and hence functionally sick and financially wreck, the SEBs thus left in the
lurch by the Governments to fend for itself, had then only one way open before them – that
leading to the private sector. But the domestic private sector remained meek and weak, ergo, the
door was to be opened to the global agents. And the siege then started – the siege of power
sector reforms!
In addition to the domestic compulsions, the move was facilitated by a most harmonious
international environment, exuberant with examples and their emulation elsewhere of ‘big
experiments’ with liberalism as in the UK under the Thatcherite privatisation regime, and with
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deregulation, as in some parts of the USA. The eventful fall of the socialist bloc and the
attendant resurrection of private enterprise drives added to this international enthusiasm. Yes,
the whole world appeared in unison to go on a pilgrimage of private sectorisation. (The only
powerful exception of the French ESI, still in the hands of the French Government, however,
was conspicuous by its exclusion from this picture.)
There has been a universal unanimity in cognising and recognising these causative and
promotional strains in the background of (power sector) reforms. However, a significant
catalytic element in the whole process has been left unaccounted for in all the reviews of
reforms initiatives – the role of the international financial agencies, viz., the World Bank and
the IMF, which in fact has been so active that a ‘leftist’ interpretation of the reform process
could identify these institutions as the prime mover. Any study of the power sector reforms
would be incomplete and biased without a study of this aspect in its proper juxtaposition with
others.
The soft loan facility, termed Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL), introduced by the World Bank in
1980, in the wake of the Chilean reforms initiative following severe financial crisis, was the
forerunner of the reforms-facilitating financial aid. The SALs were designed to provide quick-
dispersing soft loans to meet BoP crisis over a period of years in return for an agreed set of
measures of structural adjustments in the economy. The timing of the provision of assistance was
in perfect harmony with the requirements felt pinching across the developing world, as there
emerged a global financial crunch that began to haunt each country in the South in vengeful turns.
The funds-famished, but prodigal, Governments in no time seized the easy lease in full
endorsement of the pedantic rendition of the wreck in terms of their conventional infatuation with
the public sector. This has had an added advantage too – it has also opened up yet another source
of finance to the Governments – through the sell out of public sector assets. In the face of such
encouraging response to the Pied Piper during the 1980s, the Bank's original emphasis on the BoP
gradually faded with a corresponding increase in the stress on ‘economy-wide program of reforms’
(Killick 1993: 69). Later on the Bank devised another facility, more viable and effective one, viz.,
sectoral adjustment loan that aims at piecemeal reforms processes. In September 1997, especially
in the wake of Haryana’s reform efforts in power sector, the Bank started to grant Adaptable
Program Loans (APL), involving a series of loans intended to provide phased and sustained
support for the loanee’s long-term reform programmes. A number of financial agencies are there
now in the market involved in sectoral reforms facilitating loan programs; e.g., IMF set up in 1986
the Structural Adjustment Facility, augmented at the end of 1987 by Enhanced Structural
Adjustment Facility, with considerably greater resources.
15
4. Indian Power Sector on the Reform Path
As already explained, the capacity-deficient Indian power sector had the rude shock when
confronted with the fiscal crisis begotten revelation that the conventional budgetary funds
support for capital augmentation programs had dried up. The ill-ridden performance of the ESI
had already left it penniless and penurious. The prospects of international aid also appeared dim
and grim. The World Bank had (in 1989) stated that requests from ESIs in developing
countries added up to $100 billion per year against an availability of only about $20 billion
from multilateral sources (quoted in D’Sa, et al. 1999). The predicament thus posed had also its
ready-made solution prominently decked on its cap – the private sector. But the Indian capital
market, remaining in some infantilism, was too feeble and frail to support the sector and hence,
the significance of the foreign sector. It was also hoped that there would be a side-benefit in
respect of efficiency which remained at an unacceptably low level. This efficiency was thought
to be improved through the oft-claimed better management and higher technical performance of
the private sector.
The power sector reforms in India began in the 1990s when a number of incentives were offered
to Independent Power Producers (IPPs) for investing in the power sector.
Key features of the power sector reform policy introduced starting 1991 were:
(a) Private sector companies may build, own, and operate generating stations of any size
and type (except nuclear).
(b) Foreign equity is permitted in generation companies
(c) A post-tax return on equity of 16 per cent at a plant load factor (PLF) of 68.5 per cent is
guaranteed, based on a two-part tariff formula, which covers both fixed and variable
costs.
(d) Additional returns (of 10 to 12 percentage points) on equity allowed where the PLF
exceeds 68.5 per cent.
(e) Free repatriation of dividends and of interest on foreign equity and loans.
(f) A five-year tax holiday for new generation and distribution companies.
(g) Protection from exchange rate fluctuations.
(h) Depreciation rates on plant and machinery have been increased.
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(i) Custom duty on imports of equipment has been reduced by 20 per cent.
(j) A private power generator can sell power to anyone with the permission of the
concerned State Government.
Subsequently, the Indian Electricity Act of 1910 and the electricity (Supply) Act of 1948 were
amended in 1996 to enable the setting up of State and Central level electricity regulatory
commissions. Each State and Union Territory was to set up an independent State Electricity
Regulatory Commission (SERC) to deal with tariff fixation, that is, to determine the tariff for
wholesale or retail sale of electricity and for the use of transmission facilities. Later on the GOI
issued an ordinance which was later converted into an act in 1998 (The Electricity Regulatory
Commission (ERC) Act, 1998), to enable the appointment of regulators at the national and state
level. At the Centre, a Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) was set up (on 24
July 1998) to deal with all state-level appeals and inter-state power flows. Such commissions
had already been set up in Orissa in 1996 and in Haryana in 1998 under state legislation. With
the concurrence of the central Government, Andhra Pradesh passed a separate Regulatory and
Restructuring Act in 1999, in line with the Orissa and Haryana acts. Due to the federal nature of
our Constitution, the central government had decided that though it would pass an Electricity
Regulatory Commission Act, it would not impose a restructuring model on any state by central
legislation, and that it would only issue guidelines and model acts for the consideration of the
states.
Since April 1, 1999, The Central Electricity Authority (CEA) has entrusted the CERC with the
task of regulating power tariffs of central government power utilities, inter-state generating
companies, and inter-state transmission tariffs. One of the important objectives of CERC is to
improve operations in the power sector, by means of measures such as increased efficiency,
large investments in the transmission and distribution (T & D) systems, time-of-day pricing,
and power flow from surplus to deficit regions. Further, the central government or the CERC
can grant a transmission license to anyone to construct, maintain, and operate any inter-state
transmission system under the direction, control, and supervision of the central transmission
utility.
In 2003 the Central Government introduced a new Act, which stands to replace the existing three
Acts, that govern the power sector. The three Acts are the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, Indian
Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, and the recently enacted Electricity Regulatory Commissions Act,
1998, that together constituted the legal foundation for the power sector in India till now.
Electricity Act, 2003 now replaced all these three Acts. The objective of the Act is supposed to
introduce competition, protect consumers’ interests and provide power for all. The Act provides
for a National Electricity Policy, rural electrification, open access in transmission, phased open
access in distribution, mandatory SERCs, license-free generation and distribution, power trading,
17
mandatory metering and stringent penalties for theft of electricity. The purported aim is to push the
sector onto a trajectory of sound commercial growth and to enable the States and the Centre to
move in harmony and coordination.
A very significant provision in the Act is that all the SEBs of present constitution will ‘wither
away’ as the new Act comes into effect. This has since the introduction of the Bill in 2000 led
to a very heated controversy. However, it is open to a State Government to set up its own SEB
if it wants the existing system to continue. In fact, once the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 is
done away with, the very existence of SEBs, the establishment of which was the objective of
the Act, comes to a natural end. Now the State Government needs to reconstitute the SEB, if it
so desires, through its own legal provision. At the same time, on the other side appears the fact
that once the SEBs cease to exist following restructuring, then the very Electricity (Supply) Act
of 1948 becomes redundant. Hence the significance of the replacement. Part 13 of the Act deals
with the reorganization of the SEBs in detail.
The Act envisages time-bound radical restructuring in terms of unbundling and corporatization.
All the States have to establish State Regulatory Commissions, authorised to supervise, direct
and control all the activities in the ESI. This implies that the Government interference in the day
to day affairs of the sector is minimized, though the Government is still allowed to wield
significant powers. The Act also seeks to establish spot market for electricity through pooling
arrangements. This necessitates setting up of an independent system operator (ISO) for
transmission such that the ‘wires business’ becomes one of national dimension rather than of
inter-State dimension. There is a threat, however, lurking in such development in that the
concurrent, federal, nature of authority of the States on the ESI may soon be superseded by
centralised, unitary, authority. The Act in fact gives an impression that the subject of electricity,
instead of being in the Concurrent List, is in the Central List, with far too many rooms for
centralization and standardization. Policies on all matters, namely, the national electricity policy
and plan, and even the national policy on standalone systems for rural areas and non-
conventional systems, and the national policy on electrification and local distribution in rural
areas are all matters for formulation by the central government (section 3).
The Act also plans, in a bid to facilitate a level playing field for transmission sector participants
(transmitters), to restrict the role of the Central Transmission Utility – PGCIL – to that of power
grid management only, divesting it of the other role of being also a player in the transmission
business. This is in the wake of a long-standing feud between PGCIL and the CERC over a
directive issued by the CERC to the Power Grid in 1999 to operate its business and perform its
role as a grid manager as separate autonomous business units. The earlier version of the
Electricity Bill vested the regulatory control in the transmission sector with the PGCIL;
however, the recent version (sixth draft) has restored (in line with the Electricity Amendment
Act, 1998) the power to the CERC with some minor modification.
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A major criticism levelled against the Act has been that there is not enough emphasis on rural
electrification in the Act and that the Act actually over-emphasizes commercialization of power
(in Part 7 of the Act) rather than making available power to everybody. The Act as such has
caused much flutter and protest; many States (for example, Kerala) and SEB employees suspect
the Central move as an attempt to usurp the State’s authority on the power sector, and impose
restructuring where the State is unwilling.
Before enactment of the Electricity Act, 2003, some of the States had enacted State Electricity
Reforms Acts, which provided for reorganization of their State Electricity Boards (SEB). Section
172 (a) of the Electricity Act, 2003 provides that the SEB shall be deemed to be the State
Transmission Utility (STU) and a licensee under the provisions of the Act for a period of one year
from the appointed date, i.e. 10th June, 2003. However a SEB can continue for some more time as
agreed to mutually by State and Central Government. Thus Kerala had obtained time upto 9 June
2004, which was then extended to September 9, 2008. Though this time also elapsed (though
another 15 days extension was granted), the present LDF Government is by no means willing to
surrender.
So far, 13 States have reorganized their SEBs. 10 States namely, Orissa, Haryana, Andhra Pradesh,
Karnataka, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Rajasthan, Delhi, Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh have done
so under their State Electricity Reforms Acts. In Orissa, Delhi and Noida in UP power distribution
was entirely privatized. Assam, Maharashtra and West Bengal (w.e.f. 1.4.2007) have reorganized
their SEBs under the provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003. The SEB of Assam presently
continues to discharge the licensee function only for trading of electricity. Government of Tripura
has corporatized its electricity department. The remaining states of Bihar, Jharkhand, Kerala,
Punjab, Chhattisgarh, Tamil Nadu, Meghalaya and Himachal Pradesh are in the process of
formulating schemes for reorganisation of their SEBs.
The first move towards such reform process was initiated in Orissa, even before the formulation of
the CERC at the Centre. Orissa Electricity Regulatory Commission was the first of its kind in the
country, designed as an independent regulatory commission to regulate the power sector in the
State. The World Bank has sanctioned a loan of 350 million dollars to Orissa for its power sector
reforms.
Restructuring of the Orissa power sector started in 1996 with the enactment of the Orissa Reforms
Act, 1995. The erstwhile vertically integrated utility of the Orissa SEB was unbundled into
separate corporations – Grid Corporation of Orissa (GRIDCO) for transmission and distribution,
and Orissa Hydro Power Corporation (OHPC) for hydel generation. Subsequently, four wholly
owned subsidiary companies of GRIDCO were carved out for distribution, and later on these
subsidiary companies were privatized by the sale of 51 per cent of the share of GRIDCO’s equity
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holding. BSES took over three companies (NESCO, WESCO, and SOUTHCO) in the north, west
and south zones, and AES Corporation of USA, the central zone (CESCO). However, AES has
later on backed out from the managerial responsibility of the company, and the CESCO is now
administered by a government official. The Orissa Power Generation Corporation (OPGC) has
been disinvested to the extent of 49 per cent.
The Electricity (Amendment) Act, 2007, amending certain provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003,
was enacted on 29th May, 2007 and brought into force w.e.f. 15.06.2007. The main features of the
Amendment Act are:
(a) Central Government, jointly with State Governments, to endeavour to provide access to
electricity to all areas including villages and hamlets through rural electricity infrastructure
and electrification of households.
(b) No License required for sale from captive units.
(c) Deletion of the provisions for elimination of cross subsidies. The provisions for reduction
of cross subsidies would continue.
(d) Definition of theft expanded to cover use of tampered meters and use for unauthorized
purpose. Theft made explicitly cognizable and non-bailable.
5. Power Sector Reforms in Kerala
The waves of power sector reforms that have swept the world over and some parts of India as
well had left only moderate imprints till recently in Kerala’s power sector. It was acknowledged
in the previous state government’s electric power policy of 1998 (the first of its kind in Kerala!)
that the huge capital investment required in the power sector imposes heavy burden on the
KSEB with its weaker financial standing. During the 9th Plan period (1997-2002) projects in the
three sectors of generation, transmission, and distribution involve about Rs. 4380 crores, of
which only Rs. 350.06 crores can be had from the internal resource generation of the KSEB,
provided tariffs are revised regularly, and Rs. 735.51 crores from the State government as loans,
leaving the KSEB to rely heavily on the financial institutions (FIs) for the remaining resources.
If tariffs are not regularly revised or arrears in revenue collections build up, the borrowings will
have to be more. Given the financial status of the Board and its track record, it is found doubtful
if external loans of this order can be raised. The situation is thus made ripe for some attempts on
reforms.
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From the Power Policy of Kerala Government, 1998
Ensuring financial viability through improvement in operational
efficiency and cultivating good relationship with customers by avoiding activities
that leave them dissatisfied – these two objectives should be realised by the Board,
along with power self-sufficiency by 2000 AD. More focus should be placed on
consumer-service areas and a development-service oriented and energetic work
culture should be cultivated in the Board.
It should be strictly enforced that regular and timely meter reading,
billing and revenue collection be ensured. The spot billing procedure at present in
force in 67 sections would be gradually extended to other sections. Suitable
measures would be taken to solve the problems/difficulties of the customers in the
present system of payment of electricity charges.
A large number of three-phase meters and single phase meters
remain defective, causing substantial revenue loss to the Board. A phased program
of replacing them with electronic meters would be implemented. Further
replacement would be the responsibility of the customer himself. With the new
connections, it would be the responsibility of the customer to buy meter. The
Government would also take effective measures, besides those by the Board, to
check power theft, illegal drawal, etc. More number of anti-power theft squads
would be organised. Special squads to watch the HT – EHT customers would be
deployed. Vigilance department would be strengthened.
…. ……… …… ……… ……….
The power sector in Kerala is entering through this policy into
a long and difficult action program that would lend a new direction to
development ventures and thus ensure liberation from power crisis for ever. The
success of this action program depends upon the collective cooperation of the
people, workers, officers, and capital investors. And the Government is sure that
the people, forgetting all differences, would stand united in this save-Kerala effort.
The E. Balanandan Committee to Study the Development of Electricity in Kerala (1997)
recommended to set up a government-owned company viz., The Kerala Power Development
and Finance Corporation Ltd., to develop, finance, and manage generation of electricity,
construction and installation of power stations and transmission lines in Kerala.5 The Task
5 This reminds one of a phoenix, rising from the ashes (read: heaps of dust of neglect and negligence) of a 1984 study
by a group of well-wishing KSEB engineers entitled ‘A Decade Plan to Make Kerala Self-Sufficient in Electricity
Generation up to AD 2000’. Following the example of the Karnataka Power Corporation set up way back in 1970 by
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Force on Policy Issues Relating to Power Sector and Power Sector Reforms (1997) and the
Expert (under K. P. Rao) Committee to Review the Tariff Structure of the KSEB (1998), both
constituted by the State Planning Board, provided detailed discussion on reforms processes that
to a great extent reflects the present Government’s ideological prejudice and political
compulsions.
In the State’s electric power policy, it was clearly stated that the (then Marxist Party-led)
government had no intention of unbundling or of privatizing the SEB. The suggestion to
corporatise the three divisions of generation, transmission, and distribution was also rejected.
However, it was acknowledged that there should be significant changes in the structure and
approach of the Board. The Task Force had, inter alia, stressed that a major change in the work
culture in KSEB be required to eliminate the inefficiency inherent in it at present and
recommended that as a first step in this direction, the three operations under its control, viz.,
generation, transmission and distribution, be compartmentalised and made as profit centres,
fully accountable for the results. This arrangement was expected to facilitate the relative
efficiencies in each sector and enable KSEB to take corrective actions more effectively.
The then government accordingly initiated necessary steps to restructure the functioning of the
Board in terms of ‘profit centres’ at the levels of generation, transmission, and distribution;
three regional profit centres with head quarters at Thiruvananthapuram, Eranakulam, and
Kozhikode also were established. These regional centres would have the control over the
electricity supply in the State. The profit centres would have wide autonomous powers in
decision making in several areas including capital investment, resource generation,
appointments of personnel and so on.
Though the government promised all the help and cooperation to the IPPs, only two projects (one
mini hydro power project of 12 MW at Maniyar owned by Tata Tea Estate, and a thermal project
at Kochi of 160 MW under the ownership of BSES and KSIDC) have so far been commissioned in
the private sector. In 1997, the then government proposed some ambitious plans6 to set up power
the Karnataka SEB, these engineers suggested to form a holding company with a share capital of about Rs. 400 million
for power generation in Kerala; the idea was to lessen the financial burden on the KSEB of power development and
thus to improve the power supply situation. Detailed plans on a number of hydro power projects to be undertaken by
the corporation during the next 20 years were included in the proposal. Thanks to the far more politically
conscious trade unions in Kerala, however, the study was simply shelved away by the Government, that too during the
‘unprecedented” power crisis period! That was the Kerala model of power development!
6 The State Government signed PPA for six proposed projects with a total capacity of 2175 MW to generate 15378
MU on a tentative cost of Rs. 6529 crores with Siasen Energy Ltd., Wise Ltd.., New Delhi, Kasargod Power
Corporation, Finolec cables, Mumbai, and Kumar Energy Corporation. Besides, MoUs were signed with three
companies, BPL Ltd., KPP Nambiar Associates and EDC International, Bangalore, for setting up power plants in
Chimeni in Kannur and Manakara in Palakkad with a total IC of 1330 MW at a tentative cost of Rs. 4523 crores to
generate about 8000 MU. All these projects except one were to use Naphtha as fuel. In addition, in the public sector, a
500 MW power project was proposed by Kochi Refineries Ltd., using residual fuel, at a tentative cost of Rs. 2000
crores; 10 KSIDC-sponsored schemes using naphtha with a total capacity of 300 MW, and two diesel plants with a
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projects in the private and public sectors within 5 years, with a total IC of 5041 MW (including the
BSES, NTPC and the KSEB’s own thermal projects, works on which had already started that
time). However, the fate of these projects, other than those mentioned above, is still not known.
Despite the professed commitments and colourful plans, the required firm political will and sense
of responsibility to value common good above everything else is conspicuously missing in our
Governments. The so-called ‘Kannur-Ennore’ controversy during the late 1990s was an apt
example in point here.
The MoU for a 513 MW combined cycle power project at Kannur at an estimated cost of Rs. 1500
crores was signed in February 1995 by the KSEB and the KPP Nambiar and Associates. It was one
of the nine mega projects cleared by the High Power Committee (at the Centre) in 1995, when a
Congress-led Government was in power in Kerala. The power purchase agreement (PPA) was
signed on March 14, next year, and by the end of 1997, the Kannur project was accorded techno-
economic clearance (TEC) by the CEA. But the project was an ill-starter. The new left
Government in Kerala could not tolerate the Enron co-sponsorship of the project and hence
rejected the State clearance to the project. However, after some dilly dallying, the Government
agreed to clear the project(the Chairman of the company being a close relative of the Chief
Minister!) provided it found a new co-developer acceptable to the State Government. Thus a new
Kannur Project was then recommended by the State Government with the El Paso Energy
International of the US as the co-promoter. Kannur power project was one of the three projects in
the power sector (including the NTPC-Birla sponsored 1886 MW Ennore power project in Tamil
Nadu with 100 per cent foreign (US) participation) identified by the Union Government to be
presented at the Indo-US summit in Washington to attract US investment to India during the recent
visit by the Indian Prime Minister there. But the State Electricity Minister called the joint secretary
in the Union Power Department, on the eve of the PM’s visit to the US and said, “We have decided
in favour of Ennore and not Kannur” (The New Indian Express daily, September 20, 2000). The
Kannur project has been pictured as the most recent victim of inner party factional frictions as well
as unrequited kickback demands (The New Indian Express, September 28, 2000). The Chairman of
the company himself has later on come out and reported to the Press of the kickback demands for
Rs. 75 crores by the son of a political bigwig controlling the government. The El Paso co-
sponsorship of the project also has been rejected by the government.
The previous (Congress Party-led) state government, however, decided to swim along with the
current, by joining the group of other states in the country already engaged in radical power sector
total capacity of 24 MW, to be jointly set up by Kerala Infrastructure Development Corporation (Kinfra) and Kerala
Electricals Ltd., were also under consideration. The tentative investment on the State public sector projects was Rs.
972 crores. KSEB, on its part, proposed small thermal units in substations and 48 small hydro projects with a total
capacity of 312 MW at an estimated cost of Rs. 675 crores. And all these ambitious plans were to add to the system an
IC of 5041 MW (to generate 26371 MU) at a tentative cost of Rs. 15549 crores. (The Hindu Business Line,
September 29, 2000). Like all ambitious plans, these too still lie on paper.
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A big ‘NO’ to Unbundling and Privatisation
Restructuring is being considered [now in India] mainly because the SEBs
are operating at loss and are not in a position to meet the electricity demand and are
also considered inefficient with high T&D losses and KSEB is no exception. At the
same time, the factors that have led the SEBs into this situation, which are quite well
known, have not been removed and no attempt has been made in that direction.
…..The Task Force is of the view that before contemplating any restructuring, which
becomes irreversible, it is to be examined whether the present sickness can be
remedied without any drastic surgery by removing the problems that cause the
sickness. It is to be stressed that the problems that may arise consequent to
restructuring could be more severe than the existing ones, particularly when a large
and complex organisation like KSEB is unbundled and split into several units…..
Electric utility, unlike other engineering industries, requires perfect and total
coordination between generation and T&D. A composite organization is suited best
for this purpose. Financial assistance is likely to be extended to KSEB from banks
and financial institutions including international agencies in case its balance sheet is
healthy, which is possible only if it is permitted to follow a rational and sound tariff
policy.
The Task Force noted that the utilities, by tradition and practice, are a natural monopoly
and there can never be a competitive situation vis-a-vis the consumer. This is for the
reason that the consumer has no option to choose from more than one source providing
the utility service. The Task Force is of the view that if there were to be a monopolistic
situation, Government monopoly, which is subject to Government control keeping in
view the social objective, is far more preferable than a private monopoly where
commercial or profit making interests prevail over other considerations. The Task
Force, accordingly, strongly recommends against privatisation of transmission and
distribution activities.
(Executive Summary of the Report
of the Task Force on Policy Issues Relating to Power Sector and Power
Sector Reforms)
reforms at the terms and conditions of the central government; in August 2001, Kerala signed a
memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the Union power ministry, expressing its willingness
24
to undertake power sector reforms. As per the MoU, the KSEB was to be run on commercial lines
and also to securitise all its dues to the central public sector undertakings (CPSUs). Such
securitisation implied that the KSEB ensured that CPSU outstandings never cross the limit of two
months' billing. And in return for its commitments, the state would be provided by the central
government with funds from the Accelerated Power Development Programme (APDP) for
renovation and modernisation of thermal and hydro plants of the state and for improvement of sub-
transmission and distribution and metering in the identified circles in the state. The MoU required
the state government to 'desegregate' the KSEB to make it accountable in respect of its functions of
generation, transmission and distribution; accordingly, the KSEB was divided into three
'independent profit centres' having separate administrative set up and accounts in April 2002. The
State Electricity Regulatory Commission, with 3 members, also was set up in November 2002.
The previous political leadership in Kerala, with an ideological adherence to liberalisation, was
fast committed to large scale economic restructuring of the State. As we will see below, the
irresistible temptations of the soft loan facilities, tied to restructuring packages, and the attended
openings for big corruption deals explain the political economy of the drives. The earlier
developments whereby the State Government has stood mortgaged to the Asian Development
Bank (ADB) in respect of such a scheme have already stirred the radical conscience of the State in
a fume of protest. It must be noted that one of the major conditionalities of the ADB loan
pertained to the complete restructuring of the power sector with possible privatisation of the
distribution circles in the state. Though the Government had to backtrack, in the face of stiff
resistance by the public at large, on its initial attempt at a steep tariff hike under the ADB
direction, it did succeed later on in implementing a moderate tariff revision, confirming that a
phased tariff revision could lead to the ADB-set desirable level. And the Government was
determined to impose on the people that which has so far been a radical anathema to them. In this
background, it is worth looking into the claims of reforms as the panacea.
6. Is Structural Reform the Panacea?
Both the task Force on Power Sector reforms (1997) and the Expert Committee to Review the
Tariff structure of the KSEB (1998) have “strongly cautioned that hasty decisions in this respect
would lead to irreversible actions which could lead to many unforeseen problems. Besides, it
does not help to resolve the problems faced by the Board of inadequate tariffs, internal
resources and liquidity.” (Report of the (KP Rao) Expert Committee: Government of Kerala
1998). The present Government of Kerala, with professed leftist leanings, seems to explicitly
endorse this view. Apart from this “disastrous irreversibility” premise, the very logic of the
power sector reform process stands helplessly vulnerable to multiple points of weaknesses,
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much of this facet, however, remaining outside the plane of informed debate. Here we take up
some of them.
As explained above, private sector participation had been solicited on account of the fiscal crisis
begotten funds scarcity. But this very fiscal crisis, obvious to any open eyes, has been due to the
Government’s inability to raise the revenue receipts and/or to reduce revenue expenditures.
Instead, the axe has fallen on the capital expenditures, at the cost of development; and these
savings, in a reverse logic of necessity, have begun to contribute to the revenue account7 – such
is the public finance management of our Governments! Still worse, it is the developmental
expenditures in both the accounts8 that have suffered the most, again in a perverse logic. This
stands to ridicule all the blab of financial discipline raised in the face of the so-called fiscal
crisis. As explained elsewhere in this Report, the crisis, under the tutelage of the World Bank,
awakened the Government to the prescription of identifying fiscal stability of the economy with
very low level of fiscal deficit. This in turn implied strict measures of financial discipline
through severe expenditure cuts. But, the guillotine descended on the wrong heads – of
developmental/capital expenditures, while profligacy stood to fatten the non-
developmental/revenue expenditures, leaving the fiscal deficit, the alleged prime mover of
crisis, without any perceptible change, even in the face of increasing capital account surplus,
achieved through capital expenditure cuts ! If so, if it was not for translating any effect on to the
crisis-breeding deficit, then one naturally tends to doubt the genuineness of all the fuss and
justification of all the initiatives. Indeed, there seems to have been some snag in it. And it is to
be seen in the effects of a combination of three forces – the two indigenous factors of the
political economy of corruption and of hypocrisy in company with the exogenous World Bank
hegemony.
The much-coloured ‘fiscal crisis’ of balance of payments shortage of 1990-91 came in handy
for the World Bank to dictate conditions of ‘economy-wide structural adjustments’ or ‘reforms’
in return for soft loans provided for tidying over the shortage problem (ballooned into a ‘crisis').
The prescriptive measure of fiscal deficit reduction had a built-in effect of increasing external
dependency and thus submission. Here the World Bank rose to the occasion and exhorted,
besides imposing the structural adjustment loans, that the Government relieve itself of the
financial crunch by reducing its role to a facilitator only, instead of being as hitherto a provider.
Selling out public sector assets, accordingly, yielded two birds at a stroke – relief from public
7 Thus the revenue account has always been in the red, the deficit often shooting up at stupendous rates, for example,
in 1993-94, the Central revenue account deficit grew by more than 83 per cent over the previous year, and in 1997-98,
by more than 30 per cent. On the other hand, the capital account has been made to register surplus since 1990-91, by
cutting capital expenditure drastically relative to receipts; in 1993-94, the Central capital account surplus increased
about four-fold over the previous year, and in 1997-98, about 2.25 times !
8 In the revenue account, the developmental expenditures fell from about 55 per cent in 1980-81 to about 49 per cent in
the late nineties, and in the capital account, from about 39 per cent to around 30 per cent respectively.
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sector management burden and substantial funds. The offer of sift loans and the option of public
sector divestment were powerful enough to lure the political economy of corruption, while the
populist sentiments pampered by the religion of hypocrisy, and Governmental profligacy9 dared
not to touch revenue expenditures. And the price was paid from the capital/developmental
account. The logical culmination of such a situation was the cultivated perception that the
Government was left with no money. Now the responsibility for developmental investments
naturally devolved upon the private sector, making the World Bank approach easier. But the
domestic private sector remaining not so strong, the door was to be opened to the foreign
capital. This dynamics should have served as a frame of reference in any informed debate on
interpretations and implications of the so-called reforms move in India. Unfortunately,
however, this has not been so, so far.
The funds scarcity proposition is still weaker on another potential score also. Sadly enough,
very few eyes have been open to the folly of the fiscal deficit = instability equation setting
economics of the World Bank. This might be true in a Keynesian set up of an advanced
economy where aggregate demand and effective demand coincide, leaving an inflammable
situation for additional finance unaccompanied by additional output. On the other hand, in a less
developed economy of poor majority with low purchasing power, which in turn means over-
production or equivalently, under-utilization of capacity, pump-priming serves only to boost the
economy. However, the main thrust of our point here is that despite the World Bank
compulsion, deficit financing still continues in India as before, but now only for revenue
expenditures; this is in addition to fiscal incentives through tax reductions. At the same time,
large cuts in capital expenditures also are effected; and this situation has been capable of
fuelling inflationary flames in the World Bank economics sense, though inflation in India
remains (at least in the official claims) in the manageable reach only. Such a particular situation
of an insensitive inflationary mechanism10 in force in India, however, has been sadly missed by
many intellectual eyes and the Government too. Thus the Government, if found itself still
comfortable with deficit spending, should have, as is truly expected, drawn rein on revenue
expenditures, and effected that fiscal financing for developmental purposes, which would
necessarily have averted the dependency problem, and along with it the painful chaos of present
‘reforms’.
9 Over the high-pitched clamour for financial austerity, loom large the ever-increasing ‘jumbo-size’ Cabinets and the
attendant lackeys both at the Centre and in the States, squandering public money at will. In fact, the introduction and
institution of Panchayat Raj governance serves only to decentralise such official profligacy and corruption with wider
nets. Added to this is the populist extravaganza such as, for example, the recent freebies (free telephone facilities) from
the Telecom Minister to all his Department employees ! And still the Government has no money for the most
important power sector investments !
10 It should be noted here that inflation in India in general seems to have been to a good extent Government-sponsored,
through administrative price hikes and their spread effects (Pillai, 1995). The almost non-significance of Keynesian or
Monetarist inflation in Indian economy, thus, needs a careful analysis.
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However, this would be only a partial solution. The real resolution should have emanated from
the Electricity Board itself with an active spur from the Government. The Board should have
been functionally efficient and financially sufficient to meet all its requirements. There is no
inviolable destiny or curse that public sector be inefficient. A large number of living examples
do shatter this myth (though it still reigns supreme over a large terrain of social consciousness).
Kerala herself has enjoyed a golden era in respect of FACT under an able management. In
power sector, Maharashtra SEB had been consistently performing efficiently for a long time till
the entry of Enron. In the Central sector, the NTPC has won laurels for its top performance.11
The NTPC, accounting for about 25 per cent of India’s total power generation with an IC of
about 20 per cent, is the World’s sixth largest thermal power generator and second most
efficient, according to a survey by Datamonitor of the UK (based on 1998 performance data).
Given a conducive environment for a committed management, the Electricity Board could have
fared better true to its guiding principles of a commercial-cum-service organisation, as
interpreted by almost all the Committees. But the socio-political populist compulsions of
the Governments could not honour and ensure its statutory status of an autonomous corporation
(as required by the Electricity (Supply) Act of 1948), and they found in it a cornucopia for their
immediate gains through subsidised tariff, heavy rural electrification, and employment
generation on one hand, and corruption on the other. Had the Government compensated the
Board for all the populist favours then and there, at least its balance sheet would not have run
into the red. And all these have never been unknown to any one, and Committees after
Committees have echoed in vain the same tone. However, the Government could by no means
simply forgo this easy but powerful vehicle that it was using for translating populist baits into
its own immediate gains and the forced conversion of the Board into a Government department
prevailed.12 It is the weight of this compound of corruption and hypocrisy that in fact restrains
some of the State Governments, with ideological assertions coloured in populism, from openly
supporting the reform moves.
A legitimate question might crop up now: Why did some Governments then decide to forgo this
cornucopia ? The answer must be clear in terms of the political economy of corruption on a
large scale of favouritism and kickbacks in reaching agreements with private parties, besides the
11 “The NTPC was founded in 1976, and was pioneer in India in developing well conceived and documented systems
and procedures for construction of power plants in record time and thereafter operating the plant at record PLF. It is
therefore not surprising that NTPC annually added almost 1030 MW of new capacity in the first decade (1980-92) of
its operation at a difficult period of the economy. It also had the distinction of achieving record annual new capacity
additions of 2410 MW in 1987-88 and an average of more than 2000 MW new capacity additions in two consecutive
years thereafter.” (Business Standard, September 22, 2000)
12 Again it should not be misconstrued that a Government department per se is fated to be inefficient. It is the
inefficiency, in terms of lethargy, incompetence, non-commitment and what not, of the powers that be that is reflected
through the department.
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lure of soft loans from different agencies, made possible in the wake of the reforms.13 Kickback
rule has become an integral part of private sector participation in power sector explicitly ever
since the Enron controversy. The tendency has been to allow the kickbacks to be included in the
capital cost such that exorbitant marginal capacity cost is thrust upon the system.14 The proposal
for introducing marginal cost pricing regime should be necessarily debated in this light: Should
the society be burdened with such inflated marginal capital costs in the guise of ‘efficient’
prices ? And as we know, this corruption-push is only one frequency band in the wide spectrum
of the cost-inflation. It is not fair for a ‘welfare State’ to yield to the tendency to put all its
inefficiency upon the public, branding it as socially efficient costs, though it might be in line
with its religion of hypocrisy. This will unfortunately lead to an undesirable exclusion of the
entire poor from access to light, that even the 50 years of populism could not bring to them. In
fact, one of the serious concerns raised in the context of reform exercises is regarding the rural
access to electricity, which the 1948 Electricity (Supply) Act stood to guarantee. It is a well
known fact, confirmed by many a survey, that the unelectrified households in general belong to
the poor of the society – an ironical reflection of the Government commitment. Given the
highly skewed income/assets distribution set-up in our country, then, the so called reforms with
its intended functional structure of market orientation (manipulated by private interests of
profit- and rent-seeking of all hues that now never coincide with social interests – gone are the
reconciling days of Adam Smith!) would stand to darken the still dark alleys of the poor
section. While the Government is too eager to shirk its fundamental social responsibility of
subsidising the poor, under the chastisement of the World Bank and its indigenous pedants, all
these parties involved very conveniently forget that ‘subsidy’ is not a Third World phenomenon
only.
Another important aspect thus apparently winked at should also be highlighted. The much
taunted investment incapacity of the SEBs has been the prime leverage in justification for the
private sector participation (PSP) in the power sector. However, the SEBs being the major (if
13 There have been allegations of corruption against the present leftist Government in appointing a Canadian firm as
consultants in power sector matters in Kerala, in return for a Canadian loan. The same firm was given the contract for
Kuttiady extension works which the firm subcontracted to some other local contractors! The works, started in 1996
and expected to be completed within 3 years are still on, the power station still remaining shut down! The Government
has, however, allowed time extension and also sanctioned the demanded cost overruns to the Canadian contractor! The
Canadian consultants have also been given extension with hefty payments in fees! Again, the KSEB awarded the
maintenance works of Panniar and Sengulam projects to the same Canadian company, ignoring the recommendation of
a panel (headed by E. Balanandan) that it should not be given to this firm (The New Indian Express, 24 September
2000).
14 Enron’s original Dabhol Power Project (Phase I) reported a capital cost of Rs. 4.48 crore per MW, whereas an
indigenous NTPC project of similar type cost about Rs. 3 crore per MW that time. Enron’s cost was higher by about
Rs. one crore per MW than that of a large number of IPPs for which MoUs were signed around 1995 (see Morris
1996). The recent kickback controversy kicked up in connection with the ministerial shelving away of a private
(Kannur) power project in Kerala itself is a powerful example of the corruption potential of this area. The situation
appears even more dangerously grim when one finds that this comes from a (self-styled) leftist Government.
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not sole) purchaser of power from the IPPs, the fear of payment default tends to strike at the
very root of the PSP program, and this in turn necessitates that the SEBs be financially healthy
to provide an escrow cover for the purchase. This circularity argument just nullifies the very
PSP logic; if the SEB can afford to buy power from the IPPs (that too at higher prices15), then
why cannot it afford to have its own generation facilities (at lower costs)?
That the power sector has problems galore as the Pandora’s box of reforms is opened goes
without saying. As explained elsewhere, the terms and conditions of power purchase agreement
(PPA) for the IPP’s ‘must run’ base load plants adversely affects the merit order operation of
the power system, thus causing systemic inefficiency. The higher capital costs and the
consequent higher tariff rates result in exclusion of the majority of the poor from the ‘market’.
Moreover, the inescapable problems involved in the irreversible restructuring/dismantling of a
complex organization, as far as the experience of the Orissa experiment proves, might lead one
to doubt whether these problems are not an exorbitant cost to compensate the original problems
that the restructuring was supposed to tackle. Quite disheartening are the reports, on the power
sector management health (or even its survival itself), from Orissa, where the World Bank
model has fulfilled its full mission in terms of achieving unbundling and privatisation. Both the
State and the Central Governments have been injecting heavy doses of finance in frantic
attempts to rescue the system from imminent collapse, while the international Chief Surgeon
has just backed out after the initial incisions, requiring the domestic surgeons to do what they
can to complete the operation! While the Governments are too eager to let out any signals of a
wrong turn during the course of such a drastic surgery, one would wonder why these
Governments could not apply a little of this wisdom and sincerity during the previous phase.
Orissa and Delhi (along with Noida in UP) are the only reforming States where distribution sector
(also) is privatised; and the move is on in this direction in other reforming States of Karnataka, AP,
and Haryana also. It is generally recognised that distribution is the weakest link in the whole
structure of power supply system. The massive leakage from this inefficient outlet in the form of
subsidised sales and distribution loss, including technical loss and theft, illegal drawal, etc., under
protective patronage, have been steadily sapping the SEBs, thus taking them to a no-return point of
forced reforms. Plugging such leakage thus constitutes the urgent remedy for all the problems. And
a general perception in the informed circle endorses immediate privatisation of the distribution
sector projected as the only way out (for example, see Morris 2000). Tackling such leakage in
15 The high capital cost includes, besides the back-door payments, high returns, to the tune of 16 per cent, on capital
also. There have been criticisms from the SEB-circle itself that while the IPPs and even the Central sector generating
projects are allowed 16 per cent on equity (in addition to highly attractive incentives), the SEBs are severely
constrained by the Governments even in matters of earning the stipulated 3 per cent return. K.P. Rao Committee
recommends that the SEB be allowed 16 per cent return to provide “a level playing ground”” for it (Government of
Kerala 1998b:30). It is an irony that while the IPPs are allowed entry on the plea that it (this situation) vis-à-vis SEB
increase competition and hence efficiency, the SEB still remains constrained as a Government department, without
having a free, level playing field!
30
many rural/suburban areas involves a law and order dimension as well, and a populist
Government, so far in the habit of winking at (if not abetting) such criminal errancy, finds it
difficult to come out on the front. The Government saves its face by leaving everything to the
private sector. Thus the private distribution company in Orissa, “the AES of USA is having to
employ goon gangs to install meters”, and to collect the dues (The Hindu Business Line, March 31,
2000). See how easy the problem is solved! A blatant sell-out of governmental obligations!16
It is not that there is no alternative to such suicidal sell-out. There have been some informed
suggestions on setting up cooperatives at local levels and entrusting them or the local bodies
themselves with distribution responsibilities. For example, the Task Force constituted by the State
Planning Board on policy issues relating to power sector and power sector reforms cites the good
examples of Hukkeri Cooperative in Karnatake and Trissur Municipality in Kerala. The former is
one among the 38 cooperatives in the country set up as conceived by the Rural Electrification
Corporation. Power is supplied to these cooperatives at tariffs below the standard bulk rates such
as to enable them to operate with a surplus. In Trissur Municipality area, a licencee under the
control of the Municipality is engaged in electricity distribution in a very satisfactory manner. A
number of countries have such alternative arrangements functioning efficiently.17
All this should not be misconstrued, let us reiterate, as an unreasonable justification for the
persistence of avoidable inefficiency in the performance of the SEBs. As we have shown
elsewhere, the inefficiency problems are only internal to the system. There do remain rooms for
remedial exercises meant to remove these problems inhibiting the SEBs’ improved performance.
That is, what the system requires is only an essence-specific (internal) reform – a reformed work
culture under the leadership of an enlightened, committed, professional management and
Government should flourish and further – not a disastrous structural reform, as is fetishistically
made out now.
16 In this regard, one would be reminded of a recent Supreme Court verdict in another context (Dr. Rajkumar kidnap
case) that if a Government cannot tackle a problem with a firm political will and iron hand, wherever and whenever
required, cannot be a Government de jure and should bow out of office.
17 It is reported that the National Rural Electric Cooperatives Association (NRECA) of USA is engaged in helping to
form small cooperatives of consumers in villages and to transfer rights of distribution and transmission of electricity to
them. This experiment has been a big success in Bangladesh and Costa Rica in recent times, and previously in the US
also. In Bangladesh, the NRECA has helped to form 50 cooperatives serving 2.6 million metres. It has registered
collection of nearly 97 per cent of billing. The growth rate also is impressive – some 1000 connections are added every
day! (Business Standard, April 21, 2000).
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The Lessons from Orissa
Four years after the Orissa Government began experimenting with reforms in the power sector
under the guidance of the World Bank, Gridco, the State-owned transmission company got
crippled by a massive debt-servicing burden. The transition process had involved valuation,
apportioning and adjustments of assets and liabilities. Adjustment of subsidies and electricity
charges, totalling Rs. 340 crores, payable to OSEB/GRIDCO against the upvalued amount of Rs.
1194 crores, cast a heavy strain on the finances of GRIDCO. Moreover, a major proportion of
past losses and overdue liabilities were retained by GRIDCO with a view to successful
privatisation of the distribution companies. The four distribution companies were assigned only
the project related liabilities totalling Rs. 630 crores, while GRIDCO retained liabilities totalling
Rs. 1950 crores. In addition, GRIDCO issued Rs. 253 crore worth of shares and Rs. 400 crore
worth zero coupon bonds to the State Government. All these left GRIDCO heavily cash-strapped
and forced to default to generating companies and other suppliers. As on March 31, 2000, it had
outstanding loans of Rs. 2714.5 crores payable to financial institutions, the public and the World
Bank, and dues amounting to Rs. 1160.4 crores on account of power purchased from the
generating agencies. And Gridco had to be bailed out with a massive financial restructuring
package by the government itself. And this higher burden has already been manifested in the form
of steep hikes in energy tariff; a number of studies have come out on its inevitable fall out: drastic
fall in the number of consumers especially in rural areas. Evidently, exclusion is inevitable in a
market-driven system! And whither our ideals enshrined in the Electricity Supply Act of 1948!
All was not well with the private distribution companies also. The American company, AES,
backed out very soon, leading to the collapse of CESCO. Following this a high level committee
headed by Sovan Kunango, IAS (Retd) was set up by the government of Orissa. The Kunango
Committee Report, submitted in October 2001, is a damming indictment of both the privatisation
process and the private companies. Here are some of the major conclusions of Kunango
Committee:
(a) GRIDCO’s debt burden increased from Rs 820 crores to Rs 3300 crores.
(b) The privatisation process should have been a sequential one by which errors in privatisation
of one DISTCO could have led to avoidance of such errors in other zones.
(c) The private DISTCO neither brought in superior management skills nor working capital.
(d) The privatised DISTCOs working capital consisted of defaulting on payments to the state-
owned Gridco. Gridco’s "generosity" allowed them to pile up huge arrears (estimated at Rs
1,000 crore); AES arrears alone amounted to Rs 403 crore.
(e) The quality of management skills and personnel brought in by the private companies was
poor.
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(f) Billing and collection efficiency under the privatised DISTCOs actually worsened; from
billing and collection efficiency of 84 per cent, it went down to 77 per cent. Rampant theft
continued unabated.
(g) There was a steep increase in tariff (an annual increase of 15 % for the last 9 years) without
reduction of techno-commercial losses or improvements in consumer service. Despite the
tariff rise, the power sector runs in a revenue loss of Rs 400 crores a year.
(h) There was complete neglect of maintenance as shown by much lower expenditure under
this head compared to all other heads where expenditure grew by leaps and bounds.
(i) Huge amounts (as much as Rs 300 crores) were taken out of these companies as
consultancy fees by foreign firms.
(j) T&D losses did not show any improvement and remained at 45 per cent (pre-restructuring
period loss figure).
The conclusion of the report was that the power utilities would not break even in Orissa even if the
retail tariff goes up from its current figure of Rs 2.81 per unit to Rs 4.32 per unit. It should be
noted that the tariff for the year 1993-94 was only Re 0.95 and the steep hike in tariff was in spite
of Orissa having a considerable amount of cheap hydro-power and low agricultural demand.
The story is not different in other reforming states also. State subsidy to the restructured power
sector has in fact increased in other reforming States like Haryana, Karnatake, Rajasthan, Madhya
Pradesh Andhra Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh also. West Bengal government had to write off Rs
9806 crores that the State power sector had incurred in terms of loan and fuel cost and Rajasthan
government has promised Rs 8400 crores in subsidy to the State’s electricity companies. It should
be noted that the power sector restructuring was advocated on the plank of this very inefficiency of
the government’s having to subsidise the sector; and the hard fact is that this inefficiency has
considerably increased after the reform! It is significant to note that a good chunk of this subsidy is
flowing out in the name of reform consultancy: consultancy fees in Orissa was Rs 300 crores, in
AP it amounted to $ 32 million and in UP $ 8 million, for example.
Private Sectorisation
It is common knowledge that the strong waves of liberalisation started to sweep across the world
along with the fall of socialism. Public sectorisation had given capitalism a new lease of life in the
face of threats from a flourishing socialism. But the disintegration of the socialist bloc, the raging
discontent that resulted in massive popular uprisings against the (quasi) socialist regimes in the
Eastern Europe and the costly inefficiency of unaccountability that characterised the public sector
in general were all detracting from the vitality of socialist slogans and had the makings of a new
twist which the stagnant history badly needed. The capitalist survival now required a new strategy
of global expansion, facilitated by a variant of laissez faire. The Thatcherite drives of private
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sectorisation in the UK, projected under a colourful TINA banner, and the deregulation bids in the
US were powerful political over-fishing in the troubled water of a vacuum of reliable pro-people
alternative. In this powerful sweep, the public sector in India, that was apparently qualified as
having fallen from the ‘commanding heights’ to the ‘demanding depths’ of inefficiency, too was
soon marked for market. Conveniently concealed in this hasty decision making were the obvious
evidences of the socio-economic development India had been able to achieve through the
‘commanding’ distributive channel of a public sector.18 The official machinery was only keen to
magnify the dark specks of avoidable functional inefficiency of a number of public sector
enterprises (PSEs) in a concerted bid to justify privatisation. Even an influential section of the
informed atmosphere of India appeared alarmed over the apparent low productivity of the public
sector, without caring for locating its sources for possible cures, and the functional inefficiency,
still avoidable or easily curable, was identified with structural/organisational deviations. This made
it easier to reach a foregone conclusion in favour of restructuring. Thus, starting with the sixth Plan
(in the early 1980s), private sectorisation in India got the full thrust at the cost of public sector with
the eighth Plan in the era of liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation, the new form of the
cyclical survival tactics of the capital.
Corruption in privatisation
In addition to major contracts and concessions, liberalisation has opened up another avenue of
corruption, that is, privatisation. This has been the single largest route of payments that has pushed
the transition economies (the countries of the former Soviet Union) to the highest level of
corruption in the world.19 China too is not an exception in this respect of its reform drives.20 An
explanation of corruption in transition views privatisation and liberalisation as market oriented
reforms that allow rent seeking and corrupt practices to proliferate. Corruption in transition is the
result in particular of the incipient nature of restraining legal and other regulatory institutions (see,
for example, Weisskopf 1992). However, this ahistorical explanations, ignoring the roots of
corruption (the Czarist Russia was one of the most corrupt nations, Massie 1980) fails to reflect
upon the conditions in the transition economies in the period immediately before and during the
18 While enlarging upon the need for Indian economy’s restructuring, the World Bank (1996: 3) had to recognise,
though in passing, that ‘India’s pre-1991 planned development strategy helped the country escape from the massive
illiteracy, recurrent famines, fertility rates of about 7 children per woman, and secular stagnation prevailing before
Independence.’
19 See, for a comparative analysis of corruption levels across countries, World Bank (1997). Corruption in the trasition
economies is explained among others by Boycko et al. (1995), Feige (1997), Kaufman and Siegelbaum (1997), Malia
(1995) and Weisskopf (1992).
20 According to Quinglian (2000), what has occurred in China since 1978 as a result of what she calls ‘the
marketisation of power’ has been nothing but a ‘socialist free lunch’ by which the politically powerful in China have
used their still awesome administrative and personal power to plunder the former state-owned economy and ‘laugh all
the way to the bank’!
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break down of the socialist system that acted as an ideal medium for the growth of ‘monetary
corruption’. The New Institutional Economics views corruption in transition as a continuum from
the past, thus recognising the legacy of corruption under the socialist system. Since institutional
changes occur slowly and incrementally, history may be taken as a predictor of the continuing
patterns of corruption during the transition (Feige 1997). Though historical path dependency is an
important framework of explanation of corruption, the experiences of the transition economies had
an immense and immediate (‘big bang’) onset of political and institutional changes that were by no
means evolutionary nor incremental. The changes imposed through ex cathedra proclamations in
fact disregarded the need for a conscious development of a rule of law to substitute, while
unleashing the reins of order of the old regime. And the resultant chaos filled the vacuum with full
corruption.
The transition in India on both the occasions (of initial public sectorisation and the later
liberalisation) was however within the confines (of a modicum) of rule of law.21 But the historical
path dependency of corruption still stuck in the inevitable loopholes of rules.22 Unlike the Western
industrialised nations, India (and other developing countries) could not pass through a character-
smelting cultural revolution in the progressive phase of the development of capitalism. Just as
colonialism in these countries had found it profitable to prop up the corrupt cultural vestiges of the
old feudal system, so did capitalism too. Thus corruption continued as if determined by a historical
necessity for the State.
In the initial period of moulding a socialistic pattern of society under a sacrosanct planning system
in India, almost every economic activity had some contact with control and regulation. Where
control and regulation were tighter and grew in complexity, political and bureaucratic discretion in
administering controls naturally involved an increasing scope for rent seeking (Government of
India 1964: 7-8). Though Gunnar Myrdal (1968: 942-943) believed ‘on the basis of scanty
evidence’ that India, ‘where a moralistic attitude is especially apparent’, might ‘…on the balance,
be judged to have somewhat less corruption than any other country in South Asia’, Santhanam
Committee (on Prevention of Corruption 1964) found corruption as an increasing function of
economic controls in the Indian planning system.23 Krueger, who formalised the notion of rent
seeking, estimated in 1974 the annual welfare costs of rent seeking on account of price and
quantity controls in India to be about 7.3 per cent of the national income of 1964, ‘judged large
relative to India’s problems in attempting to raise her savings rate.’ (Krueger 1974: 294).
Following the same ‘procedure of approximating rent seeking costs by the value of rents created
21 To be precise, the changes in India were not political and institutional, but were in the ruling economic principles.
22 See Thakur (1979) for a detailed discussion on corruption in the ancient India. Myrdal (1968 Chap. 20) gives a good
discussion on corruption in modern India, extensively quoting from Santhanam Committee Report (1964).
23 For one example, the Committee (Government of India 1964b:18) found that import licences in India were worth
100 to 500 per cent of their face value!
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by controls’ in the external sector, capital market, goods market (including agriculture) and labour
market, Mohammad and Whalley (1984) however found the cost of rent seeking to be
approximately 30 to 45 per cent of the national income in 1980-81.
To the extent that politicisation of economic activities through control regimes results in vast scope
for corruption, its antidote is sought in depoliticisation. Thus liberalisation, while putting an end to
administrative discretion24 of control raj over the private sector in principle closes down the
associated avenues of corruption too. Where control is over ownership rights (the state sector),
depoliticisation of economic activities entails privatisation, i.e., conversion of control rights,
involving discretionary political and official actions, into private, market-driven choices,
supposedly free of corruption. But an important question, not at all addressed in this respect is: are
the benefits from elimination of costs of control rights greater than the costs of profit-driven
private choices? Here we concur with the liberal socialists who would still say: ‘Officials subject
to democratic control seem preferable to private corporation executives who practically are
responsible to nobody.’ (Lange and Taylor 1938: 109-110). This is especially so in a country like
India where the private sector is characterised by an absence of transparency in its functioning, let
alone that of its susceptibility to social control. The infamous dysfunctionings of the capital
market with the corresponding predatory behaviour of its actors lends sufficient credence to such a
view.
Privatisation, transfer of control rights, is expected to reduce corruption, but the privatisation
transaction itself can be corrupt in the same way as in the award of concessions and contracts. The
prospective buyers may vie and pay for getting included on the list of pre-qualified bidders as well
as for restricting the number of other bidders. Rose-Ackerman (1999) illustrates three more corrupt
practices in this respect. (1) In the absence of a scientific method of valuation of assets of the state
enterprise marked for privatisation, the uncertainties of the process can facilitate scope for insider
plays. The favoured buyer can easily procure information not available to others, or much earlier
or reserve special treatment in the bidding process. He can even get the assessment process
corrupted in his favour by having assessors of his choice get the bid and do the work. (2) With no
assets evaluation criterion to rule, corrupt officials can under-value a state enterprise in return for
pay off. The firm may be presented as unhealthy and its prospects, feeble such that the favoured
buyer can outbid others. (3) The prospective buyers would be keen and ready to pay more to retain
whatever monopoly power was available to the state firm. ‘To an impecunious state and its
bidders, assuring monopoly power is in the interests of both. Thus the conflict between revenue
maximisation and market competition arises for all privatisation deals. If a state gives lip service to
24 ‘Where there is power and discretion, there is always the possibility of abuse, more so when the power and
discretion have to be exercised in the context of scarcity and controls and pressure to spend public money.’
(Government of India 1964b: 9)
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competitive principles, however, it may be unable to endorse monopolisation openly. Corrupt
back-channel deals can then accomplish that objective…’ (Rose-Ackerman 1999: 37).
Privatisation of electricity sector in the Indian context is obviously ominous of disaster. The assets
of SEBs are highly under-valued; the gloomy presentation of a sick SEB would further cut into its
value. Howsoever professedly meticulous the assets valuation rule(s), privatisation would thus
amount to a cheap sell-out. The very high corruption potential would just add to this woe. The
whole assets, accumulated by two generations of tax payers over a period of half-a-century, would
thus be lost for a one-time paltry payment to the then government to squander.
Moreover, privatisation of the electric utility necessarily involves the problem of retention of
monopoly power of some degree, as history amply shows. Manzetti (1994) argues, among other
cases, that the privatisation of electricity industry in Chile involved such (unfair) deals that
could generate monopoly rents for the winners. For another example, the two major generators
in the English electricity supply industry, viz., National Power and PowerGen, had enjoyed
sufficient market power in the Pool to raise prices and make supernormal profits (Green 1999).
Rent seeking costs, related to such monopoly power retention processes, as explained earlier,
are necessarily accommodated in higher market prices. In the English electricity supply industry
too, as elsewhere, the increased cost was passed on to small consumers (ibid.).
The drive for power sector reform in India has been opening up a vast field for corruption in
which the international lenders too have been eager to claim their stakes. Such experience
comes with its rude shock from Orissa itself where the World Bank has been a major party to
misappropriate and squander a good part of its structural adjustment loan to the state in the
name of consultancy fee, service charges, and so on. The Government has been forced to opt for
foreign firms, instead of capable indigenous firms, as consultants in the reform programme, in
violation of guidelines. Crores of rupees have been drained away into the consultants’ coffers,
of course with a part of it re-channelled into some domestic pockets also. The same is the case
in almost all the States, whether or not the Government in power is keen on implementing
any reforms at all. Even in Kerala, that is dead against the so-called power sector reforms,
there have been much heated allegations of corruption in respect of appointing a Canadian firm
(SNC Lavalin) as consultants on ‘power sector reform-related policy matters’.
Yet another disastrous consequences comes from the fact that a private enterprise system
necessarily works on exclusion principle. The vast scope for lodging all sorts of large scale rent
seeking costs in over-capitalisation stands pretty well to inflate supply costs that can exclude a
sizeable proportion of consumers with limited purchasing power. Higher incidence of exclusion
would be one of the deleterious social costs of private sectorisation in a poor country like ours,
leading to increasing or excessive inequality, both individual and regional. As argued by
Galbraith (1998), though in another context, the process, beyond a certain indefinable threshold,
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may become cumulative and unstable, and is likely to result in a loss of community and social
coherence. And all this is in addition to the wasteful expenditures and transfer of resources.
Moreover, such capital cost inflation confounds the very problem (viz., allocative inefficiency)
presumably intended to be solved through privatisation.
There is no TINA force!
As nationalisation of natural monopoly ensures both productive as well as allocative efficiency
and equity, a vertically integrated monopoly organisation of electric utility in the public sector
remains a foregone conclusion. However, an atmosphere of warring sectional interests out to
capture benefits along with a conducive regulatory policy of populism has contributed to a
mismanagement syndrome in the case of most of the SEBs (Kannan and Pillai 2002). Their
functional inadequacies and financial infirmities, though entirely avoidable, have come in handy
for a mis-characterisation of the whole sector: the costly dysfunctionings are unreasonably
identified with economic inefficiency, which in turn is associated with the standard notion of
some market structure devoid of competition. As already explained, this inevitably makes
restructuring in favour of privatisation seemingly desirable. Behind this work informed attempts
unfortunately organised to focus solely on aspects of allocative efficiency to justify the move.
For example, there are strong arguments that technological advancements (such as combined
cycle gas turbine (CCGT) plants of smaller size and shorter gestation periods) render the natural
monopoly in generation sector irrelevant and hence competition for allocative efficiency is
possible in that sector – both competition for market (initially in setting up plants, given a
corruption-free franchise bidding mechanism) and competition in market (later on during
operation, given a highly efficient ‘tatonnement’ agency) are postulated to be possible. The
distribution sector, though purely a local monopoly, also is proposed to be compatible with
competition for market. However, the invariable location specificity of plants other than CCGT
ones and the asset specificity in the transmission-distribution sector still leave the system
predominantly a natural monopoly and its nationalisation does ensure increased gains in both
equity and efficiency.25 It is at the cost of these gains and with higher (transaction) costs of co-
ordination and regulation that the hypothesised competition is being sought.
The cunning generalisation of the experience of performance disorders of some of the PSEs has
been at the cost of the name of other well-functioning ones. In the power sector itself, the
National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) continues to be a star performer by world
standard. The Maharashtra SEB (MSEB) had been adjudged as a model for other SEBs in both
physical and financial performance till the entry of the Enron through the openings of
liberalisation. The MSEB’s encounter with the Enron illustrates the potential disaster involved
25 Remember, in a country like India, rich with hydro-power potential, a judicious hydro-thermal plant mix in
generation capacity, along with considerations of high-cost gas power vis-à-vis cheap and clean hydro-power can
ensure this for a long time.
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in the new policy. At the same time, this invalidates the already unfounded claims for
liberalisation as stemming out of a TINA force of economic inefficiency; in fact the Enron a la
liberalisation has been instrumental in inducing systemic inefficiency into the MSEB.
Moreover, the glaring examples of the PSEs with golden track records have already refuted
such TINA force argument. And this becomes evermore obvious as the Indian government is
feverishly engaged in selling out only the profit making PSEs, for example, the Bharath
Aluminium Company (Balco). If privatisation is thus resorted to not on account of economic
inefficiency and out of a relevant TINA force, then, naturally a possible explanation is to be
found in the vast scope for corruption in it.
7. Conclusion
In concluding, let us re-stress the role of effective Government intervention in the interest of
common good. The emergence of governmental authority in the history of the development of
the social relations of the mankind signified the significance of common good over individual
interests, though later on the institutional intention got tainted by the power of private property
rights. The enlightened rulers of the ancients were expected to identify their own individual
interests with common interests and to rule accordingly. At a progressive stage of the
development of social history, even ‘the invisible hand’ of laissez faire could be thought of
having yielded, though initially only, the greatest social benefit through individual pursuit of
own interests. However, at a reactionary stage, as we seem to witness now, the laissez faire of
private interests would only conflict and collide with each other under the ‘animal spirits’ of a
natural selection rule. Hence the need for government intervention. This assumes added
significance especially in a less developed economy of majority poor. However, such ethical
commitments dry up under the hypocritical archetypes, ingrained in the Indian subconscious
mind, in league with the political economy of corruption. The future holds promises only with
the rise of an enlightened society out of a soul-cleansing cultural revolution, reminiscent of that
of the era of liberalism, having ‘a system of politics and administration marked by a high degree
of personal integrity’ (Myrdal 1968: 957).26 Along with the Santhanam Committee, we would
like to add: ‘We are convinced that ensuring absolute integrity on the part of Ministers at the
Centre and the states is an indispensable condition for the establishment of a tradition of purity
in public services. …..In the long run, the fight against corruption will succeed only to the
26 The Santhanam Committee (1964) long back recognised that ministers and legislators must be above suspicion and
proposed codes of conduct for these two categories of politicians and special procedures for complaints against them.
Accordingly, on 29 October 1964 itself, the Government of India released the text of a code of conduct for ministers
both at the Centre and in the states. The code required disclosure by a person taking office as minister of the details of
his and his family’s assets and liabilities as well as business interests. He was also required to sever all connections
with the conduct of any business. However, the scepticism expressed at that time itself on the loyalty on the part of the
intended persons to the codes of conduct has proved right. Myrdal in 1968 itself wrote: ‘Later, the eagerness for
reform seems to have died down. The reports are that corruption in India has recently been increasing.’ (Government
of India 1964b: 956, fn. 2)
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extent to which a favourable social climate is created. When such a climate is created and
corruption becomes abhorrent to the minds of the public and the public servants and social
controls become effective, other administrative, disciplinary and punitive measures may
become unimportant and may be relaxed and reduced to a minimum.’ (Government of India
1964b: 101-102). This underscores the imperative for a vigilant civil society, fully conscious of
and committed to its duties and rights, to act as a watchdog in the common interest. However,
the emergence of such a civil society cannot be spontaneous, but has to be striven for by
conscious public praxis in toto. Although we recognise the exertion of such public praxis by a
few concerned citizens and their organisations, the challenge is so enormous that it calls for
much greater intensification of efforts so as to eliminate, at the least, the scope for rent seeking.
It should be stated that there definitely has appeared a silver lining: thanks to controversial
power projects, there has been wide public debate as well as informed discussion, though
greater transparency in decision making, greater public participation (especially from the civil
society), and greater information dissemination are still wanting.
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